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Ecology and Police Management: Increasing Efficiency in Patrol Operations

Featured Author:

Noor Razzaq

Noor Z. Razzaq, M.S. candidate, B.S., is an instructor with varied experience across the law enforcement spectrum. He has served as Special Deputy U.S. Marshal, SWAT team operator, SWAT coordinator, entry-team instructor, police training supervisor, patrol officer, military police supervisor, and protective services officer. He has worked in multiple full-time sworn positions in different regions across the country to include the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington D.C., Chesapeake Police Department in southeast Virginia and worldwide in the U.S. Air Force as a Security Policeman.

Razzaq’s professional experience consists of work in both counterterrorism and law enforcement and includes joint operations with multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies. He has also been responsible for the development of standard operating procedures and reference manuals for Air Force and Navy law enforcement units and SWAT teams as well as the development of grading standards for tactical entry team candidates. He holds professional certificates in Crime Scene Investigation, Legal Studies and Court Process, Juvenile and Victim Services, and Domestic Violence. He is also trained in Forensic Behavior Analysis with an emphasis on offender profiling in serial rape and serial homicide cases. Razzaq has written extensively on law enforcement topics since 2007.

More articles from this author:

• Modus Operandi Vs. Offender Signature
• An Investigator's First Step in Violent Offender Profiling
• Search and Seizure of Real Property

Another strategic consideration for police managers lies specifically in the “negotiated-order” paradigm of Klinger’s theory which is rooted in the concept that human behavior occurs as a function of human understanding of the environment (Mead, 1934 as cited in Klinger, 1997). Consider that the informal social structure within a patrol district is foundational to the development and evolution of work group rules and these work group rules occur subsequent to the high officer autonomy from administrative control inherent to the job. The reciprocal effect between the median accepted or “normal” rate of crime in a given district and officer discretion often raises the bar for what police even consider to be criminal in nature or even worth their time (Klinger, 1997). And as community-level deviance increases, so does screening and prioritizing of calls-for-service by both dispatchers and officers in that district.

This occurs first, because of the inherent lack of police resources to resolve each and every minor call for service and, second, the individual officer’s and department’s overall lack of desire to give the impression of bureaucratic inefficiency by taking on high call volume with a low percentage of call resolution due to perpetually backed up calls-for-service (Klinger, 1997). And while there are universal, cross-jurisdictional “leniency ceilings” in regards to what officers will not tolerate from adults or juveniles such as (e.g., homicide, threats to officer safety, etc.) (Wilson, 1968; Klinger, 1997), attitudes and beliefs of police officers such as the acceptable mean level of localized deviance, victim deservedness, officer cynicism, and workload drastically effect the manner in which legal sanctions are applied.

With this understanding, work group rules which allow for an increase in the accepted “normal” rate of crime inadvertently help to facilitate increased crime in localized areas (e.g., the ghetto, skid row, etc). And officers who become accepting of a higher mean rate of localized crime may be less likely to put forth problem-solving and community-policing efforts. Studies by Bittner (1967) demonstrated this by acknowledging “containment” by officers of highly deviant neighborhoods and districts. Therefore, mandatory periodic rotation of officers between different districts (e.g., annually or semiannually) is advisable in order to prevent long-term stabilization of officer leniency due to overexposure to consistently high deviance.

Additionally, managers should consider the concurrent implementation of zero-tolerance initiatives in concert with rotation of officers from lower-crime higher-vigor patrol districts into more high-crime areas as a means of bringing down the localized standard of “normal” crime types and levels from both the citizen’s and officer’s perspective. An example of this occurred Albany, New York during the 1960s when there was a two-block radius of bars and brothels in the city known as the “Gut” which had been tolerated and “contained” by local police for years. In spring of 1961, the State Liquor Authority (SLA) (e.g., more vigorous law enforcement) used a localized zero-tolerance strategy to charge 26 bars with 140 total violations of permitting gambling and prostitution on premises.

Although personnel rotation and the simultaneous zero-tolerance strategy in this example came from another agency (the SLA), that other agency’s lower expectation of “median” crime levels combined with community efforts in tearing down and rebuilding the “Gut” helped to facilitate a drastic long-term reduction in the median of “normal” crime rates. In fact, Wilson (1968) notes that “to the causal visitor, Albany is now a quiet, even dull city” as a result of the aforesaid focused zero-tolerance strategy. It should be noted that officer vigor and “median” of work group accepted crime levels are only a few of many considerations when determining the appropriateness of officer rotation.

A final suggestion for police managers in consideration of Klinger’s theory of discretion pertains to the distribution of police resources and personnel. Consider the effects of resource constraints on the evolution of district-specific work group rules, which (when combined with current work group rules) has a decidedly stronger effect on officer discretion and perception of what constitutes “normal” levels of crime than do individualized police-citizen encounters (Klinger, 1997). When departments receive additional local, state, or federal funding for personnel, newly acquired funds are often used to fund new police officer positions. However, as lack of resources is a problem in higher crime districts, this money can be used to fund Community Service Officer (CSO) positions which require less money spent in training and salaries.